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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL P. REAM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID L. FITZEN, 
Defendant and Appellant, 




PAUL REAM and BANK OF SALT LAKE, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Respondents 
REAM'S BARGAIN ANNEX NO. 2, 
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 15220 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF 
THE SUPRE~~ COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Comes now the appellant, David L. Fitzen, and respect-
fully requests a rehearing in the above-entitled cause, and that 
the decision and opinion of this Honorable Court filed herein on 
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June 13, 1978, be reversed for the reason that the Supreme Court 
has erred in the following particulars: 
POINT I. THE SUPRErlli COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO GRfu~T 
APPELLANT RELIEF BY WAY OF REDUCING BY $6,000 THE EQUITY OF THE 
RESPONDENT, DAN REAr1, IN THE JOINT VENTURE. 
POINT II. THE SUPRErlli COURT ERRED IN FAILUIG TO GIVE 
APPELLANT CREDIT FOR $6,047.47 ACTUALLY RECEIVED AND DEPOSITED IN 
THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNT. 
POINT III. THE SUPRE~1E COURT ERRED IN DETERt'1INING THAT 
IT viAS PROPER TO CHARGE PITZEN !-liTH $24,483 RENT. 
POINT IV. THE SUPREilli COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ACTION TO DECLARE THE $6,000 SECURITY AGREEHENT (LIEN) VOID \"lAS 
A TORT ACTION AND HENCE A LAI.V ACTION. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIO:-l FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action, the respondent, Dan Ream, and the 
appellant, David L. Fitzen, were joint venturers, and each sought 
an accounting and a resolution of various disputes bet\veen them. 
David L. Pitzen, further seeks to have a purported $6,000 security 
agreement against the joint venture declared null and void as to 
all parties, and for damages. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court below, sitting without 
a jury. The Court below rendered judgment on plaintiff's Com-
plaint against the defendant--no cause of action--and rendered 
judgment on defendant, Fitzen's, Counterclaim against plaintiff 
in the sum of $106.03. A "verdict of no cause of action" was 
entered by the Court in favor of the defendants, Bank of Salt 
Lake and Paul Ream, and against the defendant, Fitzen, on his 
said Counterclaim against said parties. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court filed an opinion in this matter on 
June 13, 1978, affirming the decision of the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON THIS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioner herein seeks a decision on rehearing revers-
ing the judgment of the lower court in the following particulars: 
l. Directing a judgment against the respondent, 
Daniel P. Ream, and in favor of appellant in the sum of $6,425.75, 
or in the alternative,· for a new trial. 
2. As to defendants, Bank of Salt Lake and Paul Ream, 
appellant seeks reversal of judgment in their favor and that this 
Court hold that the purported $6,000 security agreement to Paul 
Ream is void, and for a new trial on the issue of damages. 
3. In the alternative, for a new trial on all issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO GRANT APPELLANT 
RELIEF BY WAY OF REDUCING BY $6,000 THE EQUITY OF THE 
RESPONDENT, DAN REA.M, IN THE JOINT VENTURE. 
It was conceded by all parties that respondent, Paul 
Ream, loaned his son, respondent, Dan Ream, $6,000 with which Dan 
made his contribution to the joint venture, and also that Fitzen 
contributed $6,000 in cash and property to the joint venture. 
(No one has ever asserted that the Paul Ream loan was made to the 
joint venture.) 
It was likewise undisputed that Dan Ream signed a $6,000 
lien on a joint venture truck without the concurring signature of 
Fitzen, contrary to the joint venture agreement. It was disputed 
whether appellant, Fitzen, ratified the the lien. Even assuming 
ratification, however, the evidence was established (and it was 
uncontradicted) that the truck was lost to the joint venture by 
reason of that lien. The evidence also established (and it was 
likewise undisputed) that just before repossession by the first 
lienholder, the truck could have been sold and the joint venture 
would have realized $6,000 over and above the amount of the first 
lien. In Point III of his Brief (and Point III of his Reply Brief) 
appellant contended that Dan Ream's equity in the joint venture 
should have been reduced by $6,000, which was lost to the joint 
venture by reason of Dan Ream's ?ersonal indebtedness to his 
father secured by the lien for $6,000 on the truck .. \lso, the 
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Joint Venture Agreement ?rovided in paragraph 11 thereof that 
"Each of the parties hereto agrees to assume 
and pay his own separate debts and to indemnify the 
other against the same and all expenses on account 
thereof." 
In its opinion in this matter, the Supreme Court 
held that 
"Nhile this contention may have substance, the 
record before us precludes us from resolving that 
issue." 
In this, we think the Court has erred. 
As we read the opinion of the Court, the Court appar-
ently felt that the element that is lacking is an accounting of 
the "partnership assets". The opinion states: 
"The initial partnership assets consisted of the 
1974 vfuite truck and a Caterpillar tractor, and it is 
entirely possible that additional assets were acquired, 
yet neither of the partners sa1v fit to provide the 
trial court with any accounting of those assets." 
We think that it is error to speculate as to other possible 
assets. We think it was error to withhold relief to appellant 
because the accounting didn't cover possible assets. Likewise 
it is error to deny appellant relief on the basis of lack of 
accounting as to the truck or the tractor for these reasons: 
(1) We submit that the parties did include an accounting 
of the equipment to the extent nossible. That is to say, the 
payments and expenses of the equipment were set forth. The 
equipment itself couldn't be shown in the accounting because 
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the joint venture had no equipment. The truck and the tractor 
were both lost to it, and that was undisputed, and that is cer-
tainly why neither party listed those "assets". The accounting 
and the 561 page record were silent as to "other" equipment 
because there was none. 
(2) Furthermore, even if the parties had in fact failed to 
make a complete accounting of all of the equipment, that should 
not have precluded such relief as can be determined from the 
matters which are presented. The proper rule would seem to be 
that, as to items not presented in evidence by either party, 
such items must be deemed to be neutral; that is, to have no 
significant bearing on the outcome. 
In this case, the circumstances of the loss of the 
truck and the extent of the loss to the joint venture were intro-
duced in evidence, and relief as to that item should not be denied 
because details of some other equipment were not felt by either 
party to be material to the outcome of the case. (To avoid repe-
tition, we refer the Court to page 17 of appellant's Brief and 
to pages 13 to 20 of appellant's Reply Brief. 
To hold that this matter was not properly raised below 
not only brings about a serious injustice to appellant, but also 
reflects unfairly upon counsel. 
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POINT II. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT 
CREDIT FOR $6,047.47 ACTUALLY RECEIVED ru~D DEPOSITED 
IN THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNT. 
In Point I of appellant's Brief (page 8) and in Point 
I of Appellant's Reply Brief (pages 7 to 10), appellant asserted 
that even if it were proper to charge appellant for theoretical 
earnings (rent) as opposed to actual earnings, that appellant 
should nevertheless receive credit against said sum for amounts 
actually collected and deposited in the Fitzen-Ream joint ven-
ture checking account. The receipt of these monies was not dis-
puted, and copies of the deposit records (which were never con-
tradicted) were introduced in evidence by plaintiff himself as 
part of Exhibit P-12. Copies of those records (5 pages) are 
set forth in full next to the end of Appellant's Abstract of 
the Transcript of Evidence heretofore filed with this Court on 
this appeal. 
The Supreme Court has in its opinion denied this relief 
to appellant. The opinion refers to the power of the Supreme Court 
to review both law and fact, but in deference to the "better posi-
tion" of the trial judge to judge "credibility" and observe 
"demeanor", the Court declined to change the trial court's account-
ing. In reaching this conclusion, the Court was apparently influ-
enced by certain shortcomings in Fitzen's bookkeeping (as the 
Court appeared to feel). We think, however, that in reaching its 
decision, the Court has overlooked the fact that the correction 
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in the accounting which appellant seeks is based upon undisputed 
records. It is thus not a matter of the lower court's having 
an advantaged position, and certainly Fitzen should not be denied 
an undisputed credit because of shortcomings relating to other 
natters, even assuming such. The Supreme Court stated the cor-
rect rule in its opinion as follows: 
"As has been stated on numerous occasions, we 
shall not disturb the findings and judgment unless 
they are clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
The Court failed to apply that rule to this case and in so doing 
has committed error. It is true that when faced with this rather 
obvious error on appeal, respondent has attempted to justify the 
error, not by claiming that the said $6,047.47 was not received 
and deposited properly, but by claiming that Pitzen's memory was 
incomplete on the Fitzen-Ream checking account transactions. 
We think it an unfair requirement and not in accord with 
equity to insist that Fitzen remember every detail of those trans-
actions as a condition to being allowed credit for undisputed 
deposits in that account. This is particularly so where the 
records of the Fitzen-Ream joint venture checking account were 
introduced into evidence by plaintiff himself. It should also be 
noted that plaintiff never did demonstrate a single error in those 
records at the trial. In fact, his position at trial was that all 
transactions should have been handled through said account. Onlj 
on appeal does he change his position. 
1 Bear ?.iver State '3illlk ?. cle=il1, 101 Ct 176, 1:::0 P2d 325 (l94l) :::_ted !:J~· 
the Court. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-9-
POINT III. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT IT WAS 
PROPER TO CHARGE PITZEN WITH $24,483 RENT. 
In Point I of appellant's Brief (pages 5 to 8) and in 
Point I of appellant's Reply Brief (pages 3 to 6), appellant 
claimed error by reason of the trial court's charging appellant 
with $22,483 rent. (The opinion of the Supreme Court refers to 
this sum as being $24,483.) Appellant claims that he should only 
be held to actual earnings of the equipment, not theoretical 
earnings or, in other words, rent. The Supreme Court nevertheless 
has held that it was proper to charge him with "rent". It would 
perhaps serve no useful purpose to repeat appellant's arguments 
on this point again except to point out that the decision of the 
Court appears to overlook and be in conflict with the case cited 
by appellant in his Reply Brief at page 6, to-wit: Street vs. 
Graham, 2 Ut2d 144, 270 P2d 456 (1954), where this Court held that 
it was i~proper to charge the defendant with the rental value of 
the partnership property used by him for his own purposes, but 
rather that the proper remedy was an award of one-half of the 
actual net profits from use of such equipment. The recovery was 
thus limited to actual receipts, not theoretical receipts. 
In the Graham case, plaintiff claimed that defendant 
used the partnership equipment for his own purposes and that he 
should have to pay the reasonable rental value of the property. 
The Court wisely held that, since the parties were partners, it 
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would be improper to require more than an accounting for actual 
profits. The Court likewise refused to make the defendant be 
responsible to the plaintiff for "idle time" of the equipment. 
It is respectfully submitted that this case should be 
governed by the Graham vs. Street case, but the opinion in this 
case appears to be in direct conflict with that case. 
Dunn vs. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P2d 463 (1973) is 
cited by the Court for the proposition that Fitzen, as managing 
partner, had the burden of proof and persuasion. That case does 
not stand for the proposition. It stands for the proposition 
that: 
. the party called upon to render an accounting, 
has both the burden of producing evidence and the burden 
of persuasion." (page 465) 
Since this is an action for a mutual accounting, Ream 
has the burden of establishing actual income claimed by him in 
the sum of $22,483. This he did not establish. 
In the Dunn case, at page 465, the Court said: 
"We find no authority, and appellant fails to cite 
any for the somewhat bizzare proposition that a partner 
managing a partnership business must account to his 
fellow partner for all partnership debts when the 
income from the partnership business is insufficient 
to pay the debts." 
We think it equally unfair to charge Fitzen for income 
never received. 
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POINT IV. THE SUPRE!lli COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION 
TO DECLARE THE $6,000 SECURITY AGREEMENT (LIEN) VOID 
\'lAS A TORT ACTION AND HENCE A LAW ACTION. 
This matter was first raised by respondent, Bank of 
Salt Lake, in its Brief, and appellant responded thereto in Point 
II of appellant's Reply Brief (pages 11 and 12). Those arguments 
will not be repeated here except to say that the Supreme Court, 
in concluding that the issue of the validity of the lien is not 
subject to review as being in law, looks to form that than sub-
stance. It is true that appellant used the word, "conspiracy", 
in his pleadings, but the thrust of the case was to set aside an 
instrument which appellant claimed was void. This is to say, 
the appellant sought relief in equity. It might be that the dam-
age aspect of appellant's claim against respondents, Paul Ream 
and Bank of Salt Lake, is tort and in law, but the nullifying of 
a written instrument is equitable, and so far as the validity of 
the security agreement (lien) is concerned, the Supreme Court 
should not decline to review the facts as well as the law. 
It should be noted that the conspiracy itself is not the 
actionable element, but rather the tort committed pursuant to the 
conspiracy, if any, and of course an action for damages will lie 
for that tort, whatever it may be. In support, we cite the fol-
lowing from lSA CJS, Section 21 (the same section cited in the 
Court's opinion) at page 665: 
";fuile an actlon may be for damages suffered by 
reason 0f torts committed pursuant to a conspiracy, 
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the conspiracy itself, without any actionable wrongs 
being done thereunder, ordinarily cannot be made the 
subject of a civil action, and may be of no conse-
quence except as bearing on the rules of evidence, 
the persons liable or aggravation." 
It seems clear that use of the word "conspiracy" 
should not deprive appellant of equitable relief (quite apart 
from damages) and to a proper review by the Supreme Court of 
the equitable issue of the nullification of the written instru-
ment. It requires no citation of authority, we think, to sup-
port the proposition that in Utah equitable issues and legal 
issues can exist in the same suit, and review should be forth-
coming according to the nature of the issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the decision 
of the Supreme Court entered on June 13, 1978, is in error and 
pray that the Supreme Court direct entry of judgment in favor 
of the appellant and against the respondent, Daniel P. Ream, 
in the sum of $6,425.75, or in the alternative, for a new trial. 
This sum is arrived at as follows: The accounting adopted by 
the lower court charged Fitzen with $22,483 rent. If the Supreme 
Court determines this to have been error, it is submitted that 
the most the record would support in actual income to the joint 
venture would be $15,795. From this figure should be deducted 
the sum of $6,047.47 actually received and deposited into the 
Fitzen-Ream joint venture checking account. This would leave a 
net figure of $9,747.53 chargeable to Fitzen. If that figure 
is substituted in the lower court's accounting for the $22,483, 
it will result in an increased judgment to Fitzen of $6,425.75. 
(These computations are more fully set forth at pages 6 to 8 of 
appellant's Brief.) 
We further pray that the Court reverse the judgment of 
the lower court and adjudge that the purported $6,000 security 
agreement to defendant, Paul Ream, is void, and that a new trial 
be granted on the issue of damages; or, in the alternative, for 
a new trial on all issues. 
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The foregoing Petition for Rehearing and Brief in 
Support thereof is respectfully submitted this 
of June, 1978. 
ROMNEY, MADSEN & CUMMINGS 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Attorneys for Appellant 
day 
Mailed two copies of the within Brief to each of the 
following attorneys, postage prepaid, this 30th day of June, 
1978: 
William J. Cayias 
1558 South 11th East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Dan Ream 
John A. Snow 
141 East First South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Bank of Salt Lake 
Ray H. Ivie 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Paul Ream 
~ttorney for ripnellant 
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